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27 April 1960

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 April 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*JK*  
25X1 Japan: The Kishi government, in an effort to forestall a parliamentary crisis and possible public furor, has delayed any move to secure lower-house ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty until 15 May at the earliest. The government's decision was brought about primarily by the actions of the Socialists, who backed up their demands for additional time for debate by resorting to force to block committee deliberations on the treaty. Leftist-sponsored, antitreaty demonstrations in front of the Diet on 26 April led to a violent outbreak by the radical students' association, which is also threatening violence during President Eisenhower's visit in June. [REDACTED]

*OK*  
25X1 Nepal-China: Nepalese officials have told the American ambassador that the treaty of peace and friendship which Katmandu expects to sign with Peiping during the current Chou En-lai visit will not contain a nonaggression clause barring Nepal from making defensive arrangements with third countries. Prospects for the talks as a whole have been dimmed by the inconclusive results of the Nehru-Chou conversations, the publicizing of Peiping's claim to Mount Everest, and Katmandu's belief that the Chinese and the Russians have supported recent civil disturbances inside Nepal. [REDACTED]

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OK  
Iraq: Finance Minister Muhammad Hadid, head of National Democratic party (NDP) and one of the most influential and conservative members of Qasim's cabinet, has submitted his resignation from both the cabinet and the party. Hadid has been at odds with other key NDP leaders who have been demanding the withdrawal of the party's support for the Qasim regime. His resignation may be intended to bring the issue to a head prior to the party's conference scheduled for the end of April. Qasim has not yet accepted the resignation. The loss of Hadid to the cabinet along with the party's support would limit Qasim's support almost entirely to the military. The most important cabinet positions now are held by military officers picked by Qasim.

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\*South Korea: President Syngman Rhee's formal resignation, submitted to the National Assembly on 27 April in the wake of renewed rioting in the country, is expected to be accepted immediately and to transfer to that already seriously divided body responsibility for solving the deepening political crisis. A caretaker government headed by Ho Chong, newly-named by Rhee to be foreign minister, is likely to oversee new elections but not before a struggle in the Assembly over Rhee's proposed constitutional amendment which would establish a parliamentary system of government. The ruling Liberal party is reported seeking to empower the Assembly to elect the president, while the opposition Democrats are insisting on a popular election. Rhee may attempt to succeed himself as president.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Tokyo Delays Plans to Ratify US-Japanese Security Treaty

The government of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, attempting to forestall a parliamentary crisis similar to the one which nearly caused its downfall in late 1958, has deferred until 15 May at the earliest its plan to seek lower-house ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. The government's decision derived primarily from rising public and press criticism that it was acting dictatorially in ramming the treaty through the Diet.

The Socialists, reinforced by this criticism of the government, have used force in the Diet to block committee hearings on the treaty since 22 April. Although the government's decision avoids a showdown with the Socialists for the time being, Kishi still intends to secure ratification prior to President Eisenhower's visit in June. To do so will necessitate an extension of the current Diet session, a move the Socialists oppose as strongly as the treaty vote itself. There is a strong possibility of violence within the Diet on both issues.

Meanwhile, the extreme left-wing Zengakuren students' federation on 26 April turned an orderly leftist demonstration against the treaty into a riot in front of the Diet building and is threatening further acts of violence during the Eisenhower visit. [Other leftist organizations, presently united in the antitreaty campaign, are planning to mobilize more than 100,000 persons for peaceful demonstrations during the visit.]

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Prospects of Current Chou En-lai Visit to Nepal

The treaty of peace and friendship which Nepal expects to sign with China during Premier Chou En-lai's visit between 26 and 29 April will not contain a clause barring Nepal from making defensive arrangements with third countries, according to Nepalese officials. The formal signing of this treaty and of a border agreement, already agreed upon during Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's recent trip to Peiping, is the principal item of business during the Chou visit. As part of the Katmandu government's desire to limit the Chinese premier's contact with the Nepalese public, arrangements have been made for the two premiers to meet for private conversations outside the capital.

The over-all prospects for the success of the Chou visit have been dimmed by the failure of the Nehru-Chou conversations in New Delhi, the Chinese claim to Mount Everest, and the Katmandu government's belief that both Chinese and Russian personnel in Nepal lent support to recent antigovernment disturbances. Sixteen members of the Nepalese Communist party have already been jailed for their part in the disturbances, and the government remains alert to further signs of Sino-Soviet complicity with the Nepalese Communists.

Chou is well aware of Nepalese views and may try to dispel a major source of Sino-Nepalese friction arising from the recent talks with Koirala in Peiping by suggesting that the border commission to be established should discuss the feasibility of drawing the boundary through the summit of Everest. If he is rebuffed on the clause prohibiting third-country defense arrangements, he will probably insist on a statement of "principle" against participating in military alignments. [REDACTED]

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### Rhee Resignation Extends South Korean Political Crisis

President Syngman Rhee's formal resignation, submitted to the National Assembly on 27 April in the wake of new riots in the southern city of Pusan, is expected to be accepted immediately. Rhee's surrender of power transfers to the already seriously divided Assembly responsibility for solving the deepening political crisis. A caretaker government headed by Ho Chong, the new foreign minister named by Rhee on 26 April, is likely to oversee new elections following a move by the Assembly to implement Rhee's proposal for a constitutional amendment re-establishing the parliamentary system of government which was abolished in 1954.

A serious struggle looms in the Assembly on this issue. The ruling Liberal party is reported seeking to empower the Assembly to elect the president, while the opposition Democrats are insisting on a popular election. The outcome of this struggle may determine whether Rhee attempts to succeed himself. Additional difficulties may arise over the question of new elections for the Assembly as well.

The student-led demonstrations have not produced a candidate for national leadership, but Ho Chong, as acting head of state, may be emerging as a new power. He is a former Rhee lieutenant who was acting prime minister in 1951-52. More recently, as a political independent, he has enjoyed considerable prestige in Seoul where he served as mayor in 1958 and 1959. He is not in favor with the present leadership of the majority Liberal party but has been associated with Yi Ki-pung, the controversial vice president-elect whom Rhee relieved of all posts on 26 April.

Meanwhile, the possibility of reprisals against the police for their record of brutality has resulted in the disappearance of uniformed police from the streets in Seoul. General Song Yo-chan, chief of staff and martial law commander, reportedly believes that the police will be unable to maintain order, even in a less tense atmosphere, unless the major police officials in Seoul are removed and reforms instituted.

By contrast, relations between the demonstrators and the army troops enforcing martial law have been good. General



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Song has pursued a policy of restraint against the demonstrators, while at the same time attempting to influence the government toward concessions. Further unrest, possibly generated by the anticipated political struggle in the Assembly, could induce the military establishment to undertake a more active political role. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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